1. Africa’s New Financial Architecture: The Ratification Question
The 39th AU Assembly in February 2026 advanced the New African Financial
Architecture (NAFA)—a strategic framework to mobilise capital and close Africa’s financing gap. The AU accelerated efforts to establish four core institutions: the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, the African Investment Bank, and the Pan-African Stock Exchange.But here’s the critical distinction: these institutions are not yet operationalised. They are being built.
The African Investment Bank Statute was adopted in 2009, but it still requires
ratification by member states to become fully operational. The African Monetary
The institute is functioning as a precursor to the African Central Bank, with draft statutes proposed to enhance cooperation in monetary and financial matters. An Infrastructure Investment Facility is being developed to target high-risk infrastructure projects.
This is significant because it reveals the real constraint: not technical capacity,
but political will. The institutions can be designed. The frameworks can be created.
But they only work if member states actually ratify them and commit capital.
The 2026 Summit reinforced the urgent need for these institutions to overcome
structural challenges in the global financial system. But urgency and action are different things. The question now is whether member states will move from
agreement to ratification to actual funding.
What this means: The real test is not execution—it’s commitment. Will member
states ratify these institutions? Will they fund them adequately? Will they give them the independence to operate effectively? The next 12-24 months will show whether NAFA moves from framework to reality.
2. The World Is Fragmenting: The End of Hedging
Mark Carney’s statement at Davos was precise: the international order is
experiencing a “rupture, not a transition.”
What does this mean? For decades, countries could maintain relationships with multiple powers and assume the basic rules would stay the same. That’s over.
The United States is using tariffs and visa restrictions as tools of statecraft. China
is deepening its presence through infrastructure investment. Russia is positioning itself as an alternative. The European Union is managing its own internal fragmentation.
For African countries, the old strategy of non-alignment—maintaining equidistance
from competing powers—is becoming impossible. The pressure to choose is
increasing. Countries that try to stay neutral will find themselves squeezed between competing demands.
This is not abstract. It shows up in:
What this means: The professionals who understand which way their government
will move will be able to position their firms accordingly. The geopolitical rupture is creating both risks and opportunities for those who can read it correctly.
3. AGOA: Stability With Strings Attached
The US renewed AGOA, providing duty-free access to the American market for 32
Sub-Saharan African countries. In 2024, African exports to the US through AGOA
reached $29.4 billion, according to the World Trade & Investment Association. AGOA exports grew 26% year-over-year through August 2025.
This looks like success. But there’s a critical problem underneath.
According to the International Trade Centre, average duties on AGOA exports rose by 12-14 percentage points after new US tariff measures in 2025, with an additional 0.7-1 percentage point increase after that. This means the broader US tariff environment is becoming more protectionist. The value of AGOA’s duty-free access is being eroded.
Here’s the deeper issue: To keep AGOA access, African countries may need to lower their own tariffs on US goods. This creates a strategic trap. If you prioritise AGOA access, you open your market to US competition. But opening your market undermines regional integration projects—AfCFTA, the East African Community, and SADC, which are supposed to build African resilience.
You face a choice: AGOA access or regional integration. You can’t fully have both.
What this means: This is not a simple trade benefit. It’s a strategic choice with
long-term consequences. Professionals advising on trade policy need to understand the full implications, not just the immediate market access.
4. AfCFTA: The Gap Between Vision and Reality
The African Union reaffirmed AfCFTA as the centrepiece of continental integration.
Two new platforms launched: BiasharaLink (to identify trade opportunities) and Deal House (to support deals from start to finish).
These are genuine improvements. But they reveal a fundamental problem: AfCFTA has been operating for years, yet intra-African trade remains constrained.
The numbers tell the story. Intra-African trade rose to $192.2 billion in 2023, a 3.2% in- increase from 2022. Over the past decade (2013-2022), intra-African trade grew from $98 billion to $102 billion, a 4% increase. This falls far short of AfCFTA’s transformative promise.
Why? The obstacles are structural:
But here’s what matters: BiasharaLink and Deal House will reveal which countries are serious about integration and which are not. These platforms will show which firms can operate across borders and which are constrained by local dependencies.They will identify which sectors have real integration potential.
What this means: The platforms are diagnostic tools. They will reveal the actual state of African integration—not the aspirational state. That clarity is valuable. For professionals and investors, these platforms will show which trade corridors actually work.
